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INTRODUCTION 
1 
The case of Shelbourne v Watt recently focused 
judicial attention on the long recognised but 
seldom utilized tort of enticement of a spouse. 
There are indications that New Zealand in 1980 
is finding this remedy increasingly useful in 
our restructured family law field. This case-
note will attempt to outline the history of the 
tort both in England and in New Zealand as 
developed by the common law and legislation. 
It will also attempt to analyse the particular 
effect which Shelbourne's case has had and may 
have in this hitherto rarely litigated area of 
law. It is also the writer's intention that this 
paper provoke consideration on a broader level of 
the function that the tort should play (if any), 
in the current scheme of New Zealand family law. 
To this end some analysis of the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976 and the Family Proceedings Bill 
(No. 2) 1979 will be of undoubted benefit. It 
is submitted that the tort of enticement has lost 
to a significant degree its raison d 1 itre in New 
Zealand law due to both changes in conceptions of 
the marriage relationship and a changed emphasis 
in the law of domestic relations. Both of these 
factors will be considered in detail. The 
practical difficulties in retaining the action 
in New Zealand will also be considered as will 
the problem that Shelbourne's case raises 
regarding the function of the law of tort in 
the area of marital offences. 
THE HISTORY OF THE ACTION 
(i) England 
Enticement is a cause of action which 
has existed for many centuries. It 
derived from the old action on the 
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case of per quod consortium amisit
2
• 
The action was founded (or at least 
justified) on the principle that the 
violation of a legal right committed 
knowingly is a cause of action
3
• In 
essence enticement allowed a husband 
to recover damages from a third person 
who enticed, induced, incited, persuaded 
or procured that person's spouse to 
leave him. Enticement required that 
this absence was of a continuing not a 
4 
temporary nature. 
The action was first established in the 
case of Winsmore v Greenbank
5 . In that 
case Lord Chief Justice Willis, while 
recognizing the novelty of the action 
held that when a third party without 
lawful justification persuaded another 
man's wife to leave her husband then the 
husband could recover damages by way of 
an action for enticement. At this time 
marriage was seen more strongly as a 
life union and no divorce was available 
except by Act of Parliament. The action 
was a recognition by the common law of a 
husband's proprietary interest in the 
person of his wife. The law's attitude 
to enticement and the marital relationship 
is summed up very well in McCardie J's 
judgment in Place v Searle:
6 
"Broadly speaking it was the view of 
lawyers and of the law in the middle 
of the eighteenth century that the 
property of a woman became her 
husband's on marriage; that her body 
belonged to him, that he could 
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3. 
restrain her liberty at his 
pleasure and that he could 
administer physical correction 
at his discretion, subject of 
course to the rule of moderation. 
She was his creature and his 
possession. She was debarred 
from suffrage. She was excluded 
from the professions." 
The common law in this way reflected closely 
the social values of a country governed by 
the dominant male. The position of the wife 
in the household was that of a valuable and 
superior type of servant. The damages were 
recovered for loss of service and loss of 
consortium
7
• Adultery, though closely linked 
with enticement in practical terms, was 
unnecessary for recovery. 
A notable feature of the action for enticement 
is its rare appearance in the law reports. 
The English experience shows that it did not 
seem to fill a very pressing need. From 1745 
to 1904 there were only two reported cases. 
The next appeared in 1923
8 and there have 
been only a few since then. 
The tort of enticement required some form of 
positive inducement, incitement or persuasion 
before there could be liability. The case of 
Smith v Kaye
9 established that reasonable 
advice given to the wife which encouraged her 
to leave her husband, if the advice had been 
requested by her and given in good faith, 
would not attract liability. The case of 
Place v Searle
10 followed in 1932. At first 
instance McCardie J. ruled that it was 
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necessary to show that the wife's will 
was overborne by the stronger will of the 
defendant. This was rejected on appeal 
by Scrutton L.J. who said: "The test 
must be whether something has been done 
which but for the interference of the 
defendant would not have been done". 
The enticement complained of therefore must 
have been a substantial cause in the spouse 
leaving the plaintiff. The law could have 
been summarized thus:
11 
"Enticement consists ..... is 
deliberately inducing a wife to 
leave her husband with knowledge 
of her marital status and intent 
to interfere with the spouses 
mutual duty to give consortium 
to one another. The interloper 
may have employed persuasion, 
inducement or enticement but it 
is by no means necessary that his 
was the stronger or over-bearing 
personality. More advice however 
is not actionable." 
Enticement has traditionally occurred between 
a spouse and a lover or suitor. Yet in 
Gottlieb v Gleiser
12 the question was whether 
a mother-in-law was liable at the suit of 
the husband for enticing his wife. Denning 
L.J. (as he then was) after denouncing 
enticement as an anamalous tort refused to 
extend it to this novel situation. This was 
' d. h f . h 13 done notwithstan ing t e case o Smit v Kaye 
which involved a brother and brother-in-law 
who were both found liable for suit for 
. h f h. 1 . 14 enticement. Te case o P 1 p v Squire 
also involved enticement by a relation of 
the spouse. It may also be that a spiritual 
adviser or a sect leader who induced a spouse 
5. 
to have the matrimonial home was liable 15 . 
It is submitted that Denning L.J's approach 
in refusing to extend the enticement action 
demonstrates the disapproval which the 
common law had for the enticement action. 
The action therefore was only available to 
a lover unless coming within the specific 
facts of the anomalous cases mentioned 
above. 
Originally the action lay only at the suit 
of a husband. A wife was unable to avail 
herself of this remedy due to procedural 
difficulties, particularly the need for 
joining the husband as plaintiff. This 
was extremely unlik e ly as a husband would 
be naturally reluctant to sue his own 
mistress. Furthermore any damages received 
would become the husband's property in any 
event. The right to bring an enticement 
action was extended to a wife by the case 
16 of Gray v Gee . This view was rejected in 
the Australian decision of Wright v Czedich
17 
(Isaacs J. dissenting) on the basis that a 
wife's right to the consortium of her husband 
was of a different nature from her husband's 
right. Her right, it was held, was not 
capable of financial calculation as it only 
consisted of a husband's comfort and 
attention. The wife's consortium however 
excluded the conduct of the household and the 
education of childr en , being of material value 
and therefore capable of a monetary estimate. 
This case, thankfully, stands as the only 
dissent~ voice in the wilderness. 
6 • 
Clearly social mores change over time. 
What is seen as acceptable in the social 
context of one generation may be repugnant 
to a later one. What is noticeable upon 
reading the English enticement cases since 
18 Gray v Gee is an almost universal 
criticism of the action as being anomalous 
d h · · 
19 h' ·d d an anac ronistic . T is wi esprea 
judicial hostility doubtless played some 
part in encouraging the Law Commission 
to study the merits of the action. 
In 1963 the Law Reform Committee recommended 
the general abolition of the actions for 
. d h b . 20 enticement an ar ouring . However no 
legislative action was taken to implement 
this report. In 1967 the Law Commission 
1 d k . 
21 h' h . l re ease a Wor ing Paper w ic tentative y 
called for the abolition of the enticement 
action. No such hesitancy was apparent 
a year later in Working Paper No. 19 on 
Loss of Services 22 in which the total 
abolition of the action for enticement 
was proposed. The English Law Commission 
in its Report on Financial 
. . 1 d. 2 3 Matrimonia Procee ings 
the action be abolished. 
Provision in 
recommended that 
This recommendation 
found legislative expression in the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1970 24 • No such clear resolution has yet 
occurred in New Zealand. 
(ii) New Zealand 
Actions for enticement in New Zealand have 
been very rare. The Tort and General Law 
Reform Committee 25 in 1968 evaluated the 
7. 
action's usefulness and recorrunended its 
retention. It suggested that the action 
for damages for adultery be abolished but 
that it was just to retain the action for 
enticement where a third party had been 
instrumental in causing one spouse to 
leave the other. 
26 It is submitted that the Report gives 
few positive reasons why the tort should 
have been retained. It seems more 
concerned with dispelling a multitude of 
criticisms of the action than giving any 
compelling justifications. The Corrunittee's 
recorrunendations may be summarized thus: 
1. That the action be freed from its 
historical connection with the 
2 . 
3. 
loss of service of the wife. (That 
Parliament should enact a section 
similar to section 22 of the 
Evidence Act 1908 27 ). 
That the action be available to a 
wife. 
That a legislative provision should 
allow the settlement of damages for 
the benefit of the children of the 
marriage affected. 
4. That the publication of court 
proceedings be restricted. 
5 • 
8. 
That divorce proceedings and 
an enticement action be brought 
separately. The Committee felt 
that the compulsory joinder of 
these would tend to delay and 
complicate proceedings. By its 
recommendation divorce proceedings 
based on adultery would most 
likely be brought and disposed of 
before the enticement action is 
28 brought . 
6. That just cause or reasonable grounds 
of belief (that the wife was not 
married) should be defences to the 
action. 
These recommendations in part were incorporated 
in the Domestic Actions Act 1975. The Act 
gave no exhaustive definition of what 
enticement consists of and so the common 
law as outlined is still relevant in 
determining whether enticement has occurred
29
• 
Section 3(2) of the Act freed the action 
from its historical connection with loss of 
services by stating that it is not necessary 
to prove that the plaintiff's spouse was at 
any time in the service of the plaintiff or 
that the plaintiff has suffered loss of 
services by reason of the defendant's 
inducement. Section 3(5) allowed wives to 
bring enticement actions. There appears 
to be no implementation of the recommendations 
regarding: the settlement of damages for 
the children's benefit; the restriction on 
publication of proceedings; that divorce 
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and enticement proceedings be brought 
separately or that just cause or reasonable 
belief are defences to the action. 
The first New Zealand case on enticement 
30 reported was Spencer v Relph . In that 
case the appellant and his wife had been 
married for thirty-two years and had 
twelve children when the appellant's 
wife went to live with the respondent. 
She was persuaded to return to the 
appellant but soon left to reside again 
with the respondent. Wild C.J. at 
first instance held that the wife had 
not been enticed. In the Court of 
Appeal the relevant authorities were 
exhaustively canvassed by North P. 
and the finding of Wild C.J. was affirmed. 
In the final analysis such a finding rests on 
questions of the credibility of the parties. 
The Court of Appeal was not prepared to 
substitute a positive finding for the 
negative finding of the Chief Justice. 
Clearly the Court was not prepared to extend 
the scope of the enticement action beyond 
the particular applications approved in 
earlier English decisions. 
It is submitted that proof of enticement 
is difficult in a society whose standards 
of acceptable conduct are more permissive 
than the standards applied a century ago. 
10. 
At this stage damages for the action 
would normally be compensatory in 
character. It is suggested that the 
size of damages in some earlier 
1 . h 31 h .. Eng is cases suggests tat punitive 
damages may have been included in this 
assessment. Since 1964 however and 
h f k d
3 2 . . 
t e case o Roo es v Barnar it is 
clear that punitive damages would not 
be awarded. Aggravated damages may 
have been awarded to protect the 
personality interests of the plaintiff. 
1 . 33 . . b . d In summary, Ing is , it is su mitte j 
has stated five aspects which described 
the nature of the action for enticement 
at this stage: 
1. Some affirmative action on the 
34 defendant's part . 
2 • 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The tortious conduct must be 
directed at the marital relationship. 
The action is unlikely to succeed 
if the wife is separated from or 
in desertion from her husband at 
the time of the alleged enticement
35
. 
Questions of privilege may arise 
36 
The will of the wife need not be 
overborne by the stronger will of 
the defendant. 
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11. 
h . . f h37 Te decision o Spencer v ~elp does 
little but restate the principal elements 
necessary for enticement as expounded in 
the earlier English authorities. 
In 1975 the Domestic Actions Act was 
passed. The case which followed this 
in 1978 was Shelbourne v Watt. 
SHELBOURNE v WATT 
(i) The Facts 
The respondant (Mr Watt) and his wife, 
(Mrs Watt) had been married for five 
years and had one child. Though there 
was some marital unhappiness Chi l well J. 
described the marriage as "outwardly 
happy and inwardly worthwhile and more 
than bearable". He added that the 
wife had no good reason for leaving her 
husband. The defendant ; (Dr Shelbourne) 
and Mrs Watt met in July 1976. Mrs Watt 
became increasingly attracted to the 
appellant and concerned for her own 
marriage. The relationship developed and 
in August 1976 Mrs Watt told her husband 
that she was in love with Dr Shelbourne. 
After some discussions Dr Shelbourne 
and Mrs Watt agreed not to see each other. 
However on October 4 Mrs Watt telephoned 
Dr Shelbourne and as a result Mrs Watt 
decided ultimately to live with him. 
After Mr and Mrs Watt had discussed the 
situation with both sets of parents it 
was agreed that Dr Shelbourne would not 
see Mrs Watt for six months in order that 
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the Watts could sort things out. On 
October 8 Mrs Watt returned to her 
husband. At the suggestion of a 
marriage guidance counsellor Mrs Watt 
was allowed to visit Dr Shelbourne again. 
According to Dr Shelbourne's evidence by 
this time he had told Mrs Watt that he 
eventually wished to marry her but 
wanted to take up a de facto relationship 
as marriage was impossible for a few years. 
Mrs Watt separated from her husband on 
November 1 and went to live with her 
parents, refusing to return to her 
husband. She continued to see Dr Shelbourne 
and in December 1976 decided to live with 
him. In January she moved into her own 
flat but in March began living permanently 
with Dr Shelbourne. 
Divorce proceedings ensued at the initiative 
of Mrs Watt. Mr Watt came to accept this as 
inevitablei however his increased financial 
burden consisting of increased household 
expenses and the "carve-up" of the joint 
family home under the Matrimonial Property 
Act 1976 38 he treated with less resignation. 
Enticement proceedings were brought seeking 
$30,000 by way of compensation for these 
losses. The action was heard in the Supreme 
Court at Rotorua 39 by Chilwell J. 
(ii) The Supreme Court Decision of Chilwell J. 
From the time when the defendant met Mrs 
Watt and started seeing her regularly, 
Chilwell J. held the view that the acts of 
13. 
the defendant amounted to enticement, 
"because he [Dr Shelbourne] never 
resisted her dicisions to keep away 
because he knew she could not in the end 
abide them." Childwell J. held that the 
defendant procured Mrs Watt's leaving her 
husband by remaining always available to 
console and refused to get out of the way . 
It was on this basis that Chilwell J. 
considered the tort of enticement to be 
proved. 
He further held that present social standards 
of association between the sexes were only 
relevant to the assessment of damages and 
were irrelevant to the question of whether 
enticement had occurred. This appears to 
be a much less restricted view of the 
action than the Court of Appeal in Spencer 
1h4 0 h ff" . i"f v Rep . Te case o irst instance, 
it had not been taken to the Court of 
Appeal would undoubtedly have led to an 
increase in successful enticement actions 
being brought. It is submitted that 
Chilwell J's view is unfortunate in its 
application to the facts in not demanding 
the necessary positive evidence of 
persuasion or inducement. This defect, 
given the judicial criticism the action has 
received in modern times 41 was not desired. 
Dr Shelbourne, it is said, was "waiting in 
the wings for his cue , well knowing his 
lines". Yet this is what the law allows. 
Some positive conduct of inducement is 
~ 
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required, mere inaction or remaining 
available to Mrs Watt cannot be said to 
fulfill this requirement. The law has 
never imposed a duty to reject the 
initiatives of the wife. 
As to damages, Chilwell J. restricted 
these to the heads of loss of consortium 
and loss of services and held that the 
Domestic Actions Act 1975 was endeavouring 
to use as a measure for damages the state 
of the marriage at the time when the 
enticement took place. He did not consider 
the other heads argued for i.e. compensatory 
damages for injury to the plaintiff's 
feelings, or costs incurred through the 
generation of the Matrimonial Property 
Act 1976. Judgment was entered for the 
plaintiff and damages fixed at $3,000. 
Dr Shelbourne appealed the decision and in 
1979 the Court of Appeal delivered its 
judgment. 
(iii) The Decision of the Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal judgment in Shelbourne's
42 
case differs markedly from the decision at 
first instance. For the appellate court to 
overturn the views of a judge who saw and 
heard the three parties involved shows a 
strong divergence in attitude. The leading 
judgment of Richardson J. shows the emphasis 
of the court. After establishing the 
existence of the action, the learned judge 
went on to consider the problem raised of 
when the conduct of the enticer can be 
said to cause one spouse to leave the other. 
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Richardson J. isolated four aspects of 
this concept. First the inducement must 
be of a positive character. The enticer 
must set out to influence the spouse to 
leave. Secondly, the enticer must 
perform this act with the deliberate 
intention of breaking up the marriage. 
Thirdly, a causal link must be shown 
between the defendant's conduct and the 
departure of the spouse from the home. 
Fourthly was the question of whether 
changing social attitudes can be said to 
affect the tort. Given that there are 
more relaxed codes of behaviour between 
men and women today and a greater freedom 
to form relationships outside the home of 
a social or business nature, does this 
make the ingredients of the tort as 
described above more difficult to establish? 
Richardson J. felt that the social mores 
clearly have an effect on ascertaining 
whether the ingredients of tort are 
present i.e. persuasive conduct, whether 
the defendant intended to break up the 
marriage and causation will all be 
interpreted in the light of current social 
mores. Once these factors were established 
however, "any assumptions as to social 
attitudes to the tort are irrelevant43 ". 
In commenting on the tort in this way, it 
is submitted, the successful pursuance of 
this cause of action has become more 
difficult to establish in comparison to 
Chilwell J's more flexible interpretation 
at first instance. This is particularly 
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evident when the principles above are 
applied to the facts of the case. It 
was held that the relationship between 
Dr Shelbourne and Mrs Watt developed 
over an extended period of time. The 
attitudes of both were discussed at great 
length and as equals. The various periods 
of the affair were then considered with a 
view to ascertaining whether the four 
aspects outlined above were satisfied. 
At first it is clear that in view of the 
doctor's willingness to agree not to see 
Mrs Watt for six months it would be 
unreasonable to conclude that at that 
stage Dr Shelbourne was trying to induce 
her to leave her husband. It was at 
Mrs Watt's initiative that they both began 
seeing each other for the second time. This 
falls short of the encouragement which is 
necessary to establish the tort. Dr 
Shelbourne's availability to console or 
his willingness to receive Mrs Watt was 
held not sufficient. The judge felt that 
on the face of it the conduct of Dr Shelbourne 
does not convey the impression of a man 
seeking to impose his views on a woman and 
to lure her away from her husband. 
Chilwell J. commented that Shelbourne was 
waiting in the wings - well knowing his 
lines, 44 yet the Court of Appeal considered 
this conduct was not tortious in that it 
lacked conduct of an active character 
amounting to deliberate persuasion. 
~ 
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(iv) The View of Cook J. 
Cooke J. chose to apply the law as it was 
stated in Spencer v Relph 45 • He rejected 
the argument that the defendant's action 
need be only a dominant cause of the 
spouse leaving and held the conduct 
alleged must be a substantial cause. 
This must of course be ascertained with 
reference to current social conditions. 
In evaluating Chilwell J's findings of 
f . . h 46 irst instance, e comments: 
"The language chosen: waiting, 
biding time, remaining available 
to console, knowing that in the 
end she could not abide her 
decisions to keep away, refusing 
to get out of the way, suggest 
that the judge felt constrained 
to find something less than would 
satisfy the settled test and what 
he labels inducement may have been 
in truth no more than willing 
co-operation." 
It is in applying these views to the facts that 
the effect of this judgment is appreciated. 
Cooke J. suggests that Mrs Watt's marriage was 
under strain but would have lasted if Dr 
Shelbourne had not appeared. Cooke J. 
considered that Dr Shelbourne's availability 
to Mrs Watt was allowed by the law. For 
enticement to be established more positive 
conduct on the defendant's part is required. 
An inference of a subtle encouragement of 
Mrs Watt is the most that is suggested at 
first instance. Chilwell J. linked this 
factor with a suggestion that it was Dr 
Shelbourne's duty to discourage the younger 
woman. Cooke J. held that the law does not 
impose this duty on the defendant and hence 
the appeal was allowed. 
18. 
Richmond P. briefly stated his 
concurrence with the previous judgments. 
(v) The Effect of the Decision 
Chilwell J's judgment is clearly more 
advantageous to the plaintiff in an 
enticement action. It imposes a duty to 
dissuade the "enticed" spouse. This 
goes beyond the tort of enticement as it 
has been described above, which requires 
conduct of a positive nature, causative in 
the marital break-up. This tort imposes no 
duty to dissuade but merely not to induce, 
persuade or incite. Clearly Chilwell J's 
views were not adopted by the Court of 
Appeal when the old rules were laid down 
and clarified with undoubted stringency 
severely limiting in comparison with 
Chilwell J's judgment the occasions when a 
plaintiff will succeed in this action. 
Positive words or inferences of enticement, 
substantially causative in the martial 
break-down must now be shown. In addition, 
the elements of the tort must be established 
with regard to the current levels of 
permissiveness and changing levels of 
association between the sexes. In applying 
these principles to the facts in Shelbourne 47 
it is evident that both judges were reluctant 
to find evidence of enticement. Clear words 
or inferences of persuasion were required. 
This restated strict view seems to owe more 
to the precise enforcement of the rules than 
to any change in the rules themselves. 
48 Shelbourne's case was recently followed 
. 49 . d in Howard v Aldridge A long marr1e 
~ . 
•• 
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couple with a grown-up family was involved. 
Mrs Howard had a history of psychological 
illness. Mr Howard, the plaintiff, after 
suffering an illness, found his wife in a 
compromising situation with Aldridge (the 
defendant), a man he had known for years 
in the district. Mrs Howard soon left 
to live with Mr Aldridge and the plaintiff 
sued for enticement. In a hearing before a 
jury, judgment was entered for the plaintiff 
and damages assessed at $5,000. On a motion 
f 
' I (l or non-suit McMullers J. found for the 
defendant. In so doing he based the 
decision on the principles outlined in 
Shelbourne's 50 case. He clearly felt the 
same reluctance to hold the tort established 
without strong, positive evidence of 
inducement and the n e ed for the tortious 
conduct to be a substantial cause in the 
marriage break-down. It is clear that the 
jury in this case felt sympathy for the 
plaintiff who had , in middle age . through no 
fault of his own 1 suffered a complete change 
of life-style. This was due to the equal 
division of matrimonial property under the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976 51 and the 
necessity to sell his business due to 
increased expenses. This however, though 
deserving sympathy was considered beyond 
the power of the court to rectify. 
A very recent enticement case appearing in 
New Zealand is Duke v Symonds 52 . This case 
involved a doctor allegedly enticing the 
wife of a storeman clerk. The High Court 
20. 
applied the Court of Appeal judgment of 
• h d . h lb ovr 5 3 Ric arson J. in Se Ee-B.ne . The 
issue to be resolved by the court was 
whether Dr Symonds used positive 
enticement or persuasion in order that 
Mrs Duke leave her husband. On the 
evidence it was apparent that Dr Symonds 
"made the moves" and there was little 
prospect that Mrs Duke would leave of 
her own accord 54 • On the facts of the 
case Dr Symonds had asked Mrs Symonds to 
live with him despite her initial reluctance 
and hesitation and this was positive 
evidence required to establish the tort. 
Damages were assessed by the jury at 
$26,000, an extraordinarily high amount 
and one which appears to be affected more 
by the financial standing of the defendant 
and the jury's moral disapproval of his 
conduct than actual loss of service and 
consortium. This case also made headlines 
in Truth55 high-lighting the highly 
distasteful mud-slinging that occurs in 
these actions and serving as a further 
reminder of the humiliating process for 
all concerned which an action of this sort 
has become. 
h f . d . 56 Anot er recent case o Hartri ge v Harvie 
involved the "classic" case of the plaintiff's 
best friend enticing his wife. The damages 
were assessed at $17,500. This case took 
place before the appeal in Watt v Shelbourne 
and is of limited usefulness for our 
purposes. The case is interesting for 
comments made on the question of superior 
financial means on the part of the defendant 
IV 
21. 
and its relevance to damages. It was held 
by Mahon J. that if the superior financial 
means of the defendant were used to induce 
the wife to leave the plaintiff then this 
may increase damages. The facts disclosed 
positive evidence of inducement and the 
judgment reflects the views of Spencer v 
57 Relph . It appears the future of the 
action while differing to Shelbourne's 58 
case is still very much alive. We turn 
now to the broader aspects raised by the 
decision of Shelbourne 59 . 
THE FUNCTION OF THE LAW OF TORT 
Tort law exists primarily to compensate an injured 
person. This is achieved by compelling the tortfeasor 
to pay, usually in financial terms for the damage he 
has caused60 . The punishment of the tortfeasor or his 
stigmatization for immoral conduct is outside the 
realm of this body of law. Thus it is important when 
evaluating the action for enticement not to confuse 
these aims. The plaintiff's actual and potential 
loss is what concerns the law. The Domestic Actions 
Act 1975 section 3(4) compensates the plaintiff in 
enticement only for loss of services and loss of 
consortium. The despicable conduct of the 
defendant is not relevant. The court concludes a 
financial judgment not specifically a moral one. 
It is submitted that the law of torts is inadequate 
to compensate the injury suffered in an enticement 
case (i.e. often emotional harm is paramount) nor 
is it desirable that it do so. The comments of 
d . 1 . h. d 61 Lor Denning are re evant in t is regar . 
22. 
"If a husband is to keep the affection 
of his wife he must do it by the 
kindness and consideration which he 
himself shows to her. He must put his 
faith in her, trusting that she will 
be strong enough to thrust away the 
designs of would-be lovers. If she 
is weak and false to her trust the 
harm done cannot be righted by recourse 
to law; nor is money any compensation. 
The only thing for the husband to do 
is to set to work as best he can to 
mend his broken life, a task in which 
these courts cannot help him." 
The realm of tort has hitherto been restricted for 
the most part to compensate physical or financial 
loss and it is this harm that tort seeks to remedy. 
It is submitted that even genuine enticement actions 
are often brought with purely mercenary or vindictive 
natures. It is becoming increasingly evident that 
it is impossible to compensate what is derisively 
known as "heartbalm": 
"That people of any decent instincts do 
not bring an action which merely adds 
to the family disgrace and no preventive 
purpose is served since such torts 
seldom are committed with deliberate 
plan." 6 2 
The formulated approach that the law of torts applies 
to solving disputes lies at the base of this 
criticism. The pattern that the law of negligence 
applies of: a duty, a breach of that duty, 
causation established and damage suffered, while 
appropriate to property damage seems less acceptable 
in the complex world of human emotions where causes 
are often difficult to ascribe and damage of some 
kind often pertains to both parties of the dispute. 
This brief comment brings attention to the vast gulf 
between the enticement action and the more traditional 
tortious remedies of such as nuisance and negligence. 
It is hoped that this theme will be emphasised further 
as the inquiry progresses. 
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PUBLIC POLICY 
"He that thinks a state can be steered 
by the same laws in every kind as it 
was two or three hundred years since, 
may as well imagine that the clothes 
that fitted him when he was a child 
should serve him when he is grown a 
man - the dispositions, educations, 
and tempers of men and societies 
change in a long trail of time and so 
must their laws in some measure be 
changed or they will not be useful 
for their state and condition." 63 
Should the tort of enticement be retained as reflecting 
good public policy? This question will be first dealt 
with on the level of principle. It is submitted that 
in evaluating the desirability of this action two 
conflicting aspects emerge. 
First, it is said, the preservation of the family unit 
is basic to our society 64 . This preservation is in 
the interests of the parties themselves, the children 
of the marriage and society generally. Accordingly, 
a primary function of the law is to make it clear that, 
once established, the family relationship carries 
rights, duties and obligations which cannot be defeated 
or avoided easily. Thus the enticement action 
buttresses a marriage by providing a financial 
deterrent to those who interfere with the marriage 
relationship. 
Against this is the view that it is also the law's 
function to make provision for those exceptional 
cases where a marriage goes badly wrong. The law 
must make adjustments to meet this change in 
circumstances. It is submitted that the enticement 
action deters the making of such adjustments. It 
forces unhappy partners to remain together by the 
threat of distasteful publicity and financial loss 
to the third party. The comments of Lord Gardiner 
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suggest a more enlightened approach to the problems 
of extra-marital relationships would be to abolish 
h 
. 65 t e action . 
"It will do no harm to a happy marriage 
to allow unhappy marriages to be 
decently buried; and their burial allow 
those unhappy spouses to enjoy in their 
turn the blessings of a happy married 
life• II 
Which of these alternative views is to be preferred? 
The original action for enticement was based on the 
barbaric notion that a husband had a quasi-proprietory 
interest in the person of his wife. 
This notion is abhorrent today and was clearly 
abandoned as a basis for the action with the 
extension to the wife of the right to make a claim66 . 
Over the centuries the law has changed from these 
antiquated views of the marriage relationship. 
In today's society, it is submitted, the family no 
longer performs the range of social, educational, 
recreational and economic functions which it once 
did. In past times a marriage was preserved at all 
costs to transmit wealth and power in an orderly 
fashion. A marriage break-down threatened the 
orderly process of succession for legitimate 
offspring. 
In today's society the family no longer performs these 
functions. The purpose of marriage has changed. The 
maternal, childbearing function is less important as 
is the role of the family as an economic unit. The 
ultimate result is that the primary purpose for 
maintaining marital and parental relationships lies 
in the value they have for the parties themselves. 
The need to preserve an unhappy union is no longer 
as pressing due to this reduction in the range of 
faQilial functions. 
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It is not suggested that the first view outlined 
above has been eclipsed, but rather that the present 
law places greater emphasis on the fulfillment of 
the two marriage partners 67 • Indeed, it is submitted, 
that the unfortunate effect of retaining the 
enticement action is that it may become a weapon 
which can be used to subject a spouse to continual 
matrimonial misery rather than allow that person 
the opportunity to start a new life. It was 
Chilwell J's judgment in Shelbourne's
68 
case that 
the union between Mrs Watt and Dr Shelbourne was 
the more suitable and a happier relationship than 
her first marriage. Thus, it is submitted that in 
this way the enticement action has lost its 
raison d'etre and that the action should be 
abolished. 
Another criticism levelled at this action is the 
assumptions it seems to make about the human 
character. The definition of "entice" is to allure 
a person from a place (in this case the home). The 
action for enticement, it is submitted, assumes that 
the enticer's conduct is the sole damaging influence 
and thus the enticer incurs ckvil liablity. Liability 
is not incurred by the person who may have done most 
damage to the marriage. This spouse is the one who 
has the most knowledge of the marriage situation and 
who leaves the matrimonial home. It is suggested 
that society today places greater faith in the 
individual marriage partners to resist the 
attentions of their parties. A spouse can no longer 
be viewed as an empty-headed chattel whose will can 
be manipulated at the whim of a malicious Do n Juan. 
The cases where the action for enticement might be 
said to be warranted are very small. This is admitted 
by the Tort and General Law Reform Committee in its 
IV 
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report 69 . There are situations, in the Cormnittee's 
view, where people would rightly consider it highly 
unjust if the law did not provide some remedy to a 
husband or wife whose home was disrupted by another 
man or woman. The case of a business partnership, 
where one spouse had a special skill was noted. 
This is obviously an exceptional circumstance and, 
it is submitted not adequate justification for 
keeping this tort. The small number of enticement 
actions brought adds empirical weight to the claim. 
The reasoning of the Cormni ttee seems to include a 
"punitive" basis for retaining the action. It seems 
concerned with morality and the culpability of the 
defendant rather than any actual loss suffered. It 
is submitted that enticement of a spouse is likely 
to be a symptom rather than a cause of marriage 
failure. 
It should be further noted that on the "usual" 
enticement case, without the complications of a 
business partnership; when actual loss has occurred 
this may be ameliorated by recourse to provisions in 
the Social Security Act 1964. The powers to make 
emergency payments in certain cases under section 61 
of the Act will ensure no-one is left destitute. 
This "remedy" may appear small in value, but 
damages awarded in enticement cases, as has been 
seen, are usually small anyway. 
PRACTICAL CRITICISMS OF THE ACTION FOR ENTICEMENT 
Apart from these criticisms levelled on the basis of 
principle, there are other reasons, of a practical 
nature, why, it is submitted, the action for 
enticement should be abolished. In the Report of 
~ 
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the Tort and General Law Reform Committee 70 a 
number of these criticisms were evaluated. None 
was seen as justifying per se the abolition of the 
action in the eyes of the Committee. Nevertheless, 
it is submitted that they, along with the other 
reasons contribute to the overall undesirability 
of the action and thus deserve consideration. 
One justification for the action is seen as the 
deterrent value which it has to play. It is alleged 
that spouses will be unwilling to indulge in extra-
marital relationships if a claim for enticement may be 
brought. In practical terms, it is submitted, the 
effect of retaining this action is questionable. 
Damages awarded in the past have been relatively 
low and thus financial loss is unlikely to deter. 
From the plaintiff's view there is also the danger 
in this area of moving into the realm of fantasy 
in assuming that "in this day and age money can 
adequately compensate for such injury whereas 
k . d . . h . ,, 71 man ins experience is tat it cannot . The 
damages awarded are not intended as punitive 
damages 7 2 and cannot in any way pretend to adequately 
reflect the real injury inflicted. The injury 
suffered is to a great extent to the emotions and 
is beyond monetary evaluation. To this extent 
the damage is beyond the scope of the law and must 
lie where it falls. 
A claim for enticement is often difficult to establish. 
The plaintiff must show the initiative for causing 
his wife to leave him was taken by the third party. 
This may cause some difficulty as both the "enticed" 
spouse and the enticer may both contribute to the 
ultimate separation of the marriage partners. In 
addition to this,continuing loss of consortium by 
the plaintiff, of a permanent duration must be shown. 
28. 
An enticement action may also be used as an instrument 
for blackmail 7
3
• Though this may equally be said of 
other tort actions, it is submitted that especially 
if there is collusion between spouses, the 
particularly distasteful and bitter nature of the 
claim, and the fact that there is no restriction on 
the publication of reports of the procedings 74 lends 
some weight to this criticism. 
It is also generally supposed that this action is 
harder for a woman to succeed in 75 In practice, 
it is submitted, that the law may be discriminatory 
due perhpas to juror's stereotypic thinking that a 
man is more likely to entice a woman than a woman 
entices a man. Certainly in New Zealand since the 
Domestic Action Act 1975 enticement has exclusively, 
to the writer's knowledge, the domain of the male 
as plaintiff, adding some empirical justification 
to this stereotype. 
As has been pointed out the assessment of damages is 
76 a problem with enticement. Under the Act only 
damages for loss of consortium and services are allowed. 
Yet the task of putting a monetary value on an erring 
spouse is notoriously difficult. It is submitted that 
in practice damages are often sought not for 
compensation as such but as a method of "getting back" 
at the unfaithful spouse or as a contribution for 
alleviating the losses suffered under the Matrimonial 
77 Property Act 1976 . 
The question of damages also raises an interesting 
paradox in that a husband suing for the enticement 
of his wife will get more on damages if she is proved 
to be of good character than if she is a "worthless" 
78 woman This logically follows from the view that 
as a wife-chattel the poor wife is of less value 
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to the husband than a good wife. A ridiculous 
situation which in effect discourages a good 
marriage relationship by rewarding the poor wife's 
lover and penalizing the good wife's lover. 
The character trails of the parties may also 
undermine the value of the action. It is submitted 
that where a third party is an extrovert of "excludes 
charm, personality and warmth 79 11 positive evidence 
of enticement may be more readily ascertained than 
if the alleged enticer was an introvert or of a 
more quiet nature. This may happen even though 
the inducement in emotional terms was of equal force 
in both cases. 
Thus, for the above reasons, in practice the enticement 
action has a number of problems detracting from its 
value as a justified tortious remedy and many of its 
aims in practice have indeed been frustrated by these 
difficulties. 
VI FAMILY LAW 
The Domestic Actions Act was enacted in 1975. This 
Act retained the tort of enticement of a spouse while 
abolishing damages for adultery. As has been seen 
the Report culminating in this legislation gave only 
h.p,~ . 80 
tyr1d support to the action . 
Since 1968 when the Report was first published and 
particularly since 1975 there have been significant 
changes in the field of family law. These changes, 
it is submitted, necessitated a further look at the 
value of the enticement action. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to outline the detailed history 
of our family law - a brief comment will suffice. 
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From last century the legislative emphasis in family 
law has been on the "fault principle". The 
"matrimonial offence" such as adultery or desertion 
was deeply engrained on our legal culture. The effect 
of a decision in divorce proceedings on a matrimonial 
offence ground was to declare the respondant "guilty" 
and the petitioner "innocent". The law was concerned 
with apportioning responsibility and blame for a 
marriage break-down. The whole process penalized 
the guilty party and benefitted the innocent. The 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1963 section 21 reflects 
this concern to some extent. This section outlines the 
grounds for divorce: "a conglomerate of matrimonial 
offences, grounds closely akin to a break-down, 
grounds which are a mixture of break-down and offence 
d . 1 . . h . . d ,, 8 1 an specia categories i.e. t e insanity groun s. 
Dealing with the complex world of human relationships 
in recent years the trend has been to recognise that 
moral culpability is no longer an appropriate 
measuring stick in the marital break-down situation. 
"Ask any qualified marriage counsellor 
to distinguish the innocent from the 
guilty party in the last ten marriages 
he has dealt with. He will tell you 
it is impossible to apply such concepts 
to the complex relationships of married 
people. 82 " 
The process of no longer allocating blame has a 
beneficial effect for all parties concerned. It 
draws some of the needless bitterness and rancour 
that generally arises in such situations. The 
absence of imputations of guilt spare children the 
painful sense that one parent has been branded evil 
and morally culpable while the other by comparison 
. . . . 8 3 is a paragon of virtue. The Law Commission when 
considering what good divorce law should achieve 
considers the destruction of the legal shell which 
the marriage has become should be effected with the 
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maximum fairness and the minimum bitterness, distress 
and humiliation. The whole concept of the matrimonial 
offence is, it is submitted, ridiculous. The labels 
of "guilty " and ,,. ,, 8 4 . . innocent are meaningless in such 
an overwhelming situation. The sociologist's view 
has long been expressed in these terms. The concern 
must be for the welfare of the parties involved. The 
legal position has often been at odds with this 
desire. The law sought to adjudicate in a manner more 
appropriate to criminal proceedings than marital 
break-down. It is submitted that since 1975 the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976 and the Family 
Proceedings Bill (No. 2) 1979 have gone some way to 
bring the law into line with the sociologist's view 
of family relations. It is further submitted that 
these changes have made the tort action for enticement 
inappropriate. 
The Matrimonial Property Act 1976 in its long title 
describes itself as: an Act to reform the law of 
matrimonial property; to recognise the equal 
contribution of husband and wife to the marriage 
partnership; to provide for the just d i vision of 
matrimonial property when the marriage ends. This 
intention is basically carried out by dividing the 
matrimonial property equally between the spouses 85 • 
This Act in recognising an equal contribution by both 
spouses to the matrimonial situation demonstrates 
the "no-fault" principle expressed above. Section 18(3) 
of the Act 86 adds further evidence to this view. 
The enticement action can be a potent weapon for 
defeating the state purposes of this Act. From one 
case decided in 1969 87 the passing of this Act has led 
to a noticable increase in the number of enticement 
claims being brought since that date 88 • Many of 
these actions are undertaken by a husband who hopes 
thereby to recoup some of the "losses" that a 
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settlement under the Act has entailed. Clearly 
this is an improper purpose for the tort. If 
distribution under the Matrimonial Property Act 
1976 is seen as harsh and inequitable the fault 
lies with that Act and the remedy with Parliament. 
The enticement action should not be used to defeat 
the purposes of this Act. The bringing of the action 
is not justified in these circumstances. Howard v 
Aldridge 89 may have some relevance to this situation. 
The damages in that case as assessed by the jury 
($5,000) before the non-suit was upheld were affected 
in some way by the "crie de couer" of the plaintiff 
suffering the "big carve-up" under the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976. This situation demonstrates that 
enticement in the practitioner's view appeals more 
as a tactical play to pervert the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976 than an action to gain justifiable 
compensation. 
The Family Proceedings Bill (No. 2) 1979 is, it is 
submitted another reason why the action for enticement 
should be abolished. A separate status for family 
law matters is to be recognised by the Family Courts 
/ 
Bill 1979. In keeping with this new regime the 
formulation of the Family Proceedings Bill (No. 2) 
1979 which, when passed wi l l continue the modern trend 
which emphasizes a greater flexibility being given to 
the Courts in family law matters and demonstrates the 
discernible movement away from the "matrimonial offence" 
emphasis which has hitherto pervaded the divorce area. 
This Bill gives a greater emphasis to conciliation 
and counselling of the marriage partners 90 . In Clause 
22 of the Bill the grounds for separation are given 
as "such a state of serious disharmony between the 
parties to a marriage of such a nature that it is 
unreasonable to require that the parties continue 
cohabitation with each other". This reinforces the 
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new emphasis of the Domestic Proceedings Act 
1968 section 19 in giving the newly constituted 
Family Court a discretion and flexibility in 
looking at the individual marriage partners 
involved. The new "no-fault" single ground for 
divorce incorporated in Clause 39 of the Family 
Proceedings Bill (No. 2) 1979 further illustrates 
this trend. This, it is hoped will put an end to 
h . . . . d 196 9 1 t e acrimonious enquiries un er the 3 Act 
which was marked by endless recriminations and 
resulted in an inevitable stigma for one party. 
The object now, it is submitted has become a 
definition of the existing situation in a marriage 
so that the issue is not the isolation of 
responsibility but the estimation of effects. This 
being so, it is submitted that the tort of enticement 
no longer fits acceptably into this framework. The 
nature of the judicial enquiry is centred around a 
fault finding exercise. The plaintiff seeks to lay 
ultimate responsibility for the marriage break-down 
on the "enticer". It is an adversary process in the 
true sense. It is submitted that this action not 
only defeats the objects of the Matrimonial Property 
Act 1976 but is also inconsistent with the New Zealand 
family law scheme. Developments since the luke-warm 
support of the Tort and General Law Reform Committee 
in 1968 have made it even less appropriate to today's 
legal structure and attitudes. The bitterness and 
distasteuofthe enquiry is a reminder of old concepts 
of the matrimonial offender. The action has little 
to benefit the individuals involved and has harmful 
effects to any children of the marriage in their 
relations with their parents. It is an inherently 
divisive and painful experience for all parties. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to evaluate the action for 
enticement of a spouse in terms of the decision in 
Shelbourne v Watt. It has gone considerably beyond 
the case in order to evaluate the desirability of 
retaining the action today. This has been done with 
reference to the value of the action in terms of 
public policy. It is suggested that society's 
concepts have changed markedly over the centuries 
since the action was first established and that 
our conceptions of the marriage parnership as an 
emotional rather than an economic bond and of 
human relationships generally are no longer reflected 
by the enticement action in its present form. 
It has also been submitted that the practical 
difficulties of establishing the action and its 
many technical drawbacks i.e. difficulty of proof 
and the assessment of damages for instance also 
limit the effective pursuance of whatever policy 
determinants this action was once seen to have. 
The very nature of the enticement enquiry is 
repugnant to happy family life, merely accentuating 
division and rancour in a break-down situation. 
It has also been suggested that the law of torts is 
inappropriate to the family law situation. Furthermore 
the changes suffered is to be compensated in financial 
terms which appear quite inadequate to the form of 
damage which the plaintiff in an enticement action 
may have suffered. 
The New Zealand family law structure has also been 
briefly considered with particular reference to the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976 and the Family Proceedings 
Bill (No. 2) 1979. It can be appreciated that the 
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objects of this legislation and the general 
tenor of attitudes towards family law in modern 
society are both put under strainby the nature of 
the enticement action. 
It has also been seen that the interests of the 
parties are rarely served by this action and it has 
been generally regarded as a n a chro nism over 
recent years at least in n ee d of substantial reform. 
Though Shelbourne's case has re-established the 
action as a difficult one to establish, the question 
remains of whether this law should remain on the 
statute books, particularly in view of the few 
situations where it can still operate effectively. 
It is submitted that the action has long been 
inappropriate to retain, that no positive reasons 
remain for its retention and that New Zealand should 
recognise this fact. 
RECOMMENDATION 
There appears to be no present likelihood of action 
b . k b 1· 92 . . d d eing ta en y Par iament . However it is recommen e 
that the action for enticement be given immediate 
Parliamentary scrutiny with a view to 
for the reasons outlined above. This 
1 . . . h l 9 3 tkt. . ine with the Englis examp e , A view 
its abolition 
would be in 
. d 94 in Cana a 
and South Australia as well as a number of the 
United States which have abolished the analogous 
, , , , II 95 , action for "alienation of affections . This 
action particularly at this time would be in line 
with the current New Zealand family law situation. 
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